2015 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

6-23-2015

Hossam Kassem v. Walgreens Corporate

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015

Recommended Citation
"Hossam Kassem v. Walgreens Corporate" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 647.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/647

This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 14-3644
___________
HOSSAM KASSEM,
Appellant
v.
WALGREENS CORPORATE; KAM SOLIMAN, STORE MANAGER
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 12-cv-06132)
District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 19, 2015
Before: FISHER, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 23, 2015)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
Hossam Kassem appeals the District Court’s order granting Appellees’ motion for
summary judgment. For the reasons below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

The procedural history of this case and the details of Kassem’s claims are well
known to the parties, are set forth in the District Court’s opinion, and need not be
discussed at length. Briefly, Kassem began working at Walgreens as an overnight store
clerk (“OSC”) in September 2009. After a few months, his hours were reduced, and in
July 2011, he was terminated from his position. Kassem filed a complaint in the District
Court alleging that these adverse actions were motivated by his race and age in violation
of Title VII and the Age Discrimination and Employment Act. After discovery,
Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment which the District Court granted. The
District Court assumed arguendo that Kassem had made out a prima facie case of age and
race discrimination but concluded that Kassem had failed to set forth any evidence that
Appellees’ reasons for their actions were discriminatory. Kassem filed a notice of
appeal.1
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s
order granting summary judgment de novo and review the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d
Cir. 2011). A grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if our review reveals that
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

1

Kassem concedes that the District Court correctly concluded that, as an individual
employee, Appellee Soliman was not liable under Title VII or the ADEA. Am. Brief at
27. Thus, we will consider the appeal only as against Walgreens.
2

Assuming, as the District Court did, that Kassem has established a prima facie
case of age discrimination, we must determine whether Kassem has submitted evidence
from which a factfinder could infer that Appellee’s stated reasons for the adverse actions
were pretext for age discrimination and that his age was the “but for” cause of his
reduced hours or termination. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78
(2009); Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 2009). 2
Appellee argues that Kassem’s hours were reduced due to budget cuts and his
inability to perform tasks, such as photo processing, that other OSCs could perform.
Appellee explains that Kassem was terminated based on tardiness, poor performance, and
his behavior with customers. Appellee submitted copies of several disciplinary records
indicating that Kassem was disciplined for repeatedly being late, leaving the cash register
unattended, and yelling on the sales floor.
Kassem contends that several issues are in dispute. Kassem argues that Appellee’s
claim that he could not process photos is misleading. However, he does not dispute that
he could not process photos but rather contends that it was Appellee’s responsibility to
initiate that training. Kassem disputes that he refused to service a customer on the day he

2

Kassem has removed his Title VII claim of racial discrimination from consideration on
appeal: “Plaintiff is to exclude the appeal the allegation related to Title VII , While the
remaining issues related to age discrimination is opened for today’s appeal . [sic]” Am.
Brief at 28. Moreover, as noted by Appellees, Kassem admitted at his deposition that he
had no evidence to support his claim of racial discrimination. Furthermore, we agree
with the District Court that Kassem failed to point to any evidence to establish that
Appellee’s reasons for the adverse actions were pretext for unlawful racial
discrimination.
3

was fired. However, he admits that when the customer came in towards the end of
Kassem’s shift and asked him to ring her up, he informed her that another employee
would so do because he had already signed out. Kassem does not dispute his tardiness
but believes that because he was not fired in 2010 for tardiness occurring during that
year, he could not be fired in 2011 for his continued tardiness. Kassem also does not
dispute Appellee’s allegation that he failed to return items to the shelves as he was
required to do. Rather, he contends that if a clerk was busy on the register, there would
be no time to return the items.
We agree with the District Court that Kassem has not pointed to any deposition
testimony or documentary evidence which creates a genuine dispute of a material fact
concerning Appellee’s reasons for the adverse employment actions. He has not
submitted evidence from which a factfinder could infer that Appellee’s stated reasons for
the adverse actions were pretext for discrimination based on his age or that but for his
age, he would not have had his hours reduced or would not have been terminated.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting Appellees’ motion for
summary judgment.
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